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SELF-GOVERNMENT BEFORE THE
JUDICIARY AND A FIRST AMENDMENT




Unknown to them and abhorrent to their reputations for
rousing courtroom argument, Aaron Burr, John Quincy Adams,
Thurgood Marshall and Clarence Darrow did not have the freedom
in the courtroom (trial or appellate) to offer their client's best, most
influential, argument.' Lawyers and the public share the
* J.D. Villanova I Jniversity School of Law, 2002. Mr. Braber practices
litigation at Jacoby Donner, P.C., in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Thanks to
Professor Greg Magarian for kind thoughts on an early draft.
1. These men crafted some of the most society-changing arguments at the
trial, appellate, and Supreme Court levels. Burr was legendary in the
courtroom. See GORE VIDAL, BURR 357-64, 370-76 (1973) (recounting the
primacy of Aaron Burr's legal practice at the beginning of the nation).
Adams. along with co-counsel Roger Baldwin, formed the first argument
against slavery heard by the Supreme Court. See also United States v.
Libellants & Claimants of the Schooner Amistad. 40 U.S. 518, 593-94, 596-97
(1841) (wherein former president John Quincy Adams passionately and
successfully argued that a group of mutineer Spanish slaves were not the
property of Spanish slave traders). Marshall, along with several others.
propounded the argument that successfully overthrew the establishment of
Jim-Crow and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See Jeff Blumenthal.,
When Separate Became Unequal, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 17, 2004, at 1
(summarizing the thought process that went into Thurgood Marshall's
groundbreaking argument strategy in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954), including collaboration with civil rights advocates William
Coleman, Jr. and Louis Pollack). Darrow roused the religious passions of the
nation with his arguments in defense of a Tennessee school teacher convicted
of teaching the banned theory of evolution - arguments that culminated
before the Tennessee Supreme Court. See Scopes v. State. 289 S.W. 363. 364-
misconception that the litigant may press her most fair and most
just argument to obtain the Court's full consideration.' Indeed, the
practice of law presupposes that a litigant may craft any relevant,
timely, and justiciable argument, the merits of which the Court is
duty bound to adjudicate within the inherent limitations of law,
policy, and equity) Fortunately, these conditions prevailed when
the Brown v. Board of Education4 plaintiffs presented an argument
based on sweeping societal impact that the judiciary had no choice
but to confront, despite any personal discomfort. Unfortunately,
to the dismay of would-be Marshalls and Matlocks alike, no speech
interest in courtroom argument has been recognized as protected
by the U.S. Constitution, and the judiciary generally may stifle
courtroom speech arbitrarily and without constitutional scrutiny.
This halting of litigant presentation can be direct, through outright
bans of words, or through administrative rules and procedures that
undermine (or even prohibit) argument. Currently, this trend leaps
forward without subtlety, as the Federal District of New Jersey
66. 367 (Tn. 1927) (reviewing the constitutional arguments and dismissing the
conviction on a technicality). See also Douglas Linder, Clarence Darrow.
Famous Frials in American HistorY, Univ. of Mo. Kansas City L. Sch. Project,
at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/scopes/darrowcl.htm (2004)
(recounting the public fervor generated by Darrow's argument that pitted
religious fundamentalism against science).
2. For all practical purposes, and the purposes of this Article, the
attorney and client are subsumed into the idea of a "litigant." As discussed in
Section IV, the doctrinal difficulty of separating the attorney and client is
unnecessary when discussing an expression interest in the content of relevant
argument. See infra notes 178-86 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., NANCY L. SCHULTZ & Louis SIRICO. JR.. LEGAL WRtTING,
AND OTHER LAWYERING SKILLS 245. 252-53 (3d ed. 1.998) (outlining strategies
for preparing legal briefs and arguments based on effective use of precedent
and inherently assuming that the litigant controls the argument's content).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. See PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE'S HisTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 386-
94 (1999) (describing the details surrounding the Brown arguments before
various courts and finally the Supreme Court); see also Blumenthal, supra note
1; infra note 149 and accompanying text (for further discussion on the
judiciary's own bias and difficulty with race).
6. For a discussion of the judiciary's refusal to recognize courtroom
argument as political speech, see infita Section III.
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prepares to eliminate oral argument altogether. Although oral
argument is certainly not the only type of argument a litigant offers,
dispensing with all oral presentation indicates a level of judicial
disregard for the value of courtroom argument.
The absence of a First Amendment standard that protects
the content of courtroom speech is a constitutional anomaly,
because such speech is laced with vital political importance. The
First Amendment grants political speech its most core protection.
Preserving self-government through discourse about and toward
the government is an undisputed and primary goal of the First
Amendment.' As such, the First Amendment traditionally
handcuffs government when it seeks to limit political speech."'
This Article, in Part IT, outlines the background and
7. See Henry Gottlieb, Federal District Moves to Limit Oral Arguments,
178 N.J. L.J. 845 (Nov. 29, 2004) (summarizing the debate). Many courts do
not require oral argument for all motions and even in the District of New
Jersey it is standard practice not to grant oral argument for every single
motion, but formalizing an elimination of all argument because it is considered
a "waste of time" indicates a certain lack of respect by the judiciary for the
presentations made in the courtroom. [d.
8. See Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 632 (1990) (reiterating the
long-standing protection of political speech); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 75 (1964) (referring to political speech as "the essence of self
government").
9. See First Amendment and Restrictions on Political Speech, Hearing
Before the Subconirn. omi the Const. of the House Comm. on the .IudiciarY,
106th Cong. 8-10 (1999) (Opening Statement of Chairman Charles Canady)
[hereinafter Political Speech Hearing]. Protecting speech that influences
politics is a First Amendment value that nearly every constitutional scholar
has agreed upon. See ALEXANDER MEtKLEJOHN. POLITICAL FREEDOM - THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 20-28, 78-120 (1960) (exalting the
virtue of unabridged political speech and separating popular or private speech
as less important to self government).
10. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652. 692 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (reminding the Court that "the premise of our bill of
rights, however, is that there are some things - even some seemingly desirable
things - that government cannot be trusted to do. The very first of these is
establishing restrictions on speech that will assure 'fair' political debate"). See
also David R. Cooper, Speaking Out: Lawvers and Their Right to Free Speech,
18 REV. LITIG. 671, 681-82 (1999) (summarizing the levels of scrutiny given to
various types of speech, with political speech receiving the most demanding
level).
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tradition of courtroom argument, both written and oral, and
exposes its naturally political nature." Courtroom speech invokes
the First Amendment's core protection of political speech in two
fundamental ways. First, in a common-law system, courtroom
speech carries unequaled political concern because it is a direct
appeal to a branch of government with the power to apply, alter, or
even create laws and policies that govern society. Second,
courtroom argument flows outside the courtroom to influence
public debate of legal and social issues, especially given the Internet
and the news-media's increasing ability to bring courtroom speech
to the forefront of the public marketplace of ideas.)
Such dire contribution to our body politic dictates that no
government branch should have absolute authority to halt this
important speech without recourse, yet the judiciary does just that.
Part III argues that legal standards adopted thus far to deal with
litigant speech fail to protect the political value of courtroom
argument.14 Part III first outlines the incoherence of current forum
analysis of the courtroom. Part III then describes how this
incoherence leads to nearly unquestioned power to regulate the
forum of the courtroom and allows the judicial branch of
government to escape any scrutiny for even the most arbitrary
limitations of courtroom argument.)5 Using the specific examples of
In Lirnine word-bans and "no-citation" rules, Part III illustrates
how carte blanche judicial authority to stifle relevant argument
results in surprisingly arbitrary restrictions that evoke the
significant policy concerns associated with all limitations of political
speech." Especially given the political concerns of speech in court,
11. For a discussion of courtroom argument as political speech, see infra
Part II.
12. For a discussion of the people's power in petitioning the judiciary, see
infira notes 23-54 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the judiciary's refusal to recognize courtroom
argument as political speech, see in fa notes 55-81 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the judiciary's inconsistency on First Amendment
analysis and ominous rulings against the First Amendment in the courtroom,
see in./ra notes 82-127 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the dangers of carte blanche judicial authority to
curb courtroom speech, see infra notes 128-76 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of In Lirnine word bans and "no-citation" rule, see
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these examples indicate that some substantive First Amendment
interest in the content of courtroom argument must be recognized
in order to reign in the judicial branch to the control of the people.
Finally, the inherently circumscribed forum of the
courtroom need not be inconsistent with a First Amendment
standard to protect the content of courtroom argument. Part IV
explores the courtroom as a forum for expression and formulates a
standard that will protect both the political vitality of courtroom
speech and the functional administration of justice.1 7 It is clear that,
by nature, the judiciary must halt argument through important
limitations such as jurisdiction, justiciability, or evidentiary
constraints. Arguably, these limitations are so important that they
meet the Supreme Court's strictest standard for restrictions on even
political speech." The notion of a fair and impartial judiciary,
however, implies a guarantee that litigants be free to present the
law and the equities.", Within the practical limitations, a workable
free speech doctrine emerges through a modified limited purpose
forum analysis: That all litigants hold a right to freely control the
content of their presentation to a court, adhering to justifiable
constraints of court function, to obtain the court's considered
ruling."' The political importance of courtroom argument demands,
as Justice Scalia warned in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce,' that we not trust the judiciary - which is after all an
equal branch of government - with imposing restrictions upon it
without scrutiny."
infra notes 131-75 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the courtroom as a forum for speech, see intfra
notes 177-211 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (per
curiam) (applying a standard of "strict scrutiny" to restrictions of political
speech, which requires the state to show that the law or restriction is narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling state interest).
19. See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1952) (stating that both
the practice and appearance of justice in the courtroom depend in part on "the
right of counsel for every litigant to press his claim, even if it appears
farfetched and untenable, to obtain the court's considered ruling").
20. For a discussion of the forum analysis that allows this doctrine to be
protected, see infra Section IV.
21. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
22. See id. at 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that government simply
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II. FOUNDATION: LEGAL ARGUMENT AS POLITICAL SPEECH
On the surface, arguments in the courtroom, oral or written,
do not take on the typical town-meeting characteristics that
traditionally adorn political speech . Notably, however,
descriptions of the town-meeting compare closely with the ideal
judicial proceeding: both are assembly "to discuss and act upon
matters of public interest"; both allow that "every man is free to
come" and "meet as political equals"; both require each side "to
think his own thoughts" and "listen to the arguments of others." 4
Through both direct political influence on a governmental branch
and more indirect influence on the debate of the body politic itself,
court argument shares enough significant traits with traditional
political debate to raise similar policy concerns when subjected to
arbitrary or discriminatory regulation. This political influence
compels at least some First Amendment interest in a litigant's
courtroom argument.
A. Unequalled Political Power: Directly Petitioning a Branch of
Government to Change or Determine the Law.
In perhaps no other venue does speech exert more direct
influence on the fluid laws and policies of our land than in the
"cannot be trusted" to impose restrictions on political speech).
23. See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 9, at 24-28 (describing "the
procedure of the traditional town meeting"). Meikeljohn outlines the typical
model of political debate and argues that it must be relied on to measure
validity of restraint on speech. See id. He writes:
In the town meeting the people of a community
assemble to discuss and to act upon matters of public
interest ... Every man is free to come. They meet as
political equals. Each has a right and a duty to think
his own thoughts, to express them, and to listen to the
arguments of others.
Id. at 24.
24. Id. Meiklejohn does not tackle courtroom speech protection but,
conceivably, would recognize the similarity with town-meeting political
speech.
25. For a discussion of the political vitality of courtroom argument, see
infra notes 23-81 and accompanying text.
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courtroom. The value of political speech is that, in an autonomous
society, the people are free to discuss and argue for change in the
law or even in the governing structure itself. 26 Thus, the First
Amendment holds the legislative and executive branches to the
most rigid standards when limiting this core expression.", Because
those branches answer to the people, the peoples' political
argument is perceived to have both direct and indirect impact on
law-making government. ' In a common law system, however, the
judiciary also inherently governs by establishing law.2 Because of
26. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE LJ. 877, 883-86 (1963) (discussing the value of political
expression in allowing change in naturally rigid institutions). As Emerson
theorizes, free political speech operates "as a catharsis for the body politic"
which facilitates political change, "keeping a society from stultification and
decay." Id. at 885.
27. See, e.g., Comnim'n for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425,
445 (Tex. 1998) (Gonzalez. J.. dissenting) (reminding the court that "[t]he
strong protections provided for political speech activities are robust").
28. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 9, at 26 (observing that because political
questions will be decided by a vote of the citizens, the importance of influence
in political debate is the primary concern, stating that "in that [voting] method
of political self-government, the point of ultimate interest is not the words of
the speakers, but the minds of the hearers"). In no area of legislative debate
are the concerns about the myriad influences of political speech more
zealously championed than in the area of campaign finance reform. See
Political Speech Hearings. supra note 8. Importantly, the seminal Supreme
Court case on the subject, Buckles' v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), points to the
Supreme Court's willingness to apply First Amendment concerns of "political
expression" to actions and areas that are not obviously similar to traditional
town-hall speech. Jd. at 23 (determining that campaign contributions and
expenditures are political speech). In so holding, the Buckley Court could not
discount the political influence of campaign contributions and expenditures on
the "quantity and range of debate on public issues." See id. Courtroom
argument has similar influence on public debate. See infra Section II.B.
When such political influence is at stake, the first principals cited by the Court
in Buckley are invoked.
29. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25 (reasoning that
judicial power requires judges "to determine the law" from the facts).
Differing from "Civil Law" legal systems that place less emphasis on
precedent and court-made legal doctrine, in the American system, perverted
very little from its roots in England, Common Law courts find "what was
before uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule[.]"
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69. The permanence of these
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its law-determining capacity and incomparable power, it is a point
of great discomfort that the judiciary does not directly answer to
the people as do the other branches of the government (in
perception at least). Out of this discomfort comes the usual
argument for limitation on court "activism" and restraint on court
law making.3 This argument ignores the necessity of court made
"rules" dictated by judges is established by adherence to precedent through
stare decisis. See id.
30. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 1258-60 (warning that
if judges had the legislative power, the people would be "in the hands of
arbitrary judges" who were "regulated only by their own opinions").
31. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (arguing for judicial restraint so that the
judiciary doesn't usurp the authority of the social government). The
legitimate concern of keeping the branches of government separate, however,
is often hard to parse out of the usual conservative railing against "activist
judges" who are often simply exercising judicial review. See Court Rejects Bid
to talt Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE. June 30, 2004, at B2 (reporting upon
the dismissal of a court action that argued that the Massachusetts Supreme
Court improperly usurped the power of the legislative branch); see also Susan
Milligan, House Votes to Prevent Court Review o Pledge, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sep. 24, 2004, at A3 (reporting the comments of United States Representative
Todd Akin, who authored legislation that would prohibit federal courts from
ruling on the constitutionality of including the words "under God" in the
Pledge of Allegiance). According to Akin, "activist judges" would interfere
with schoolchildren saying "under God." See id. While the Massachusetts
Supreme Court's ruling on gay marriage increased claims of judicial activism,
the national debate and litigation over the removal of life support from brain-
damaged patient Terri Schiavo raised the criticism of judicial decisions to a
full political battle over separation of powers. See, e.g., JHardball with Chris
Matthews (MSNBC television broadcast, Feb. 10, 2005) (offering commentary
from various legislative officials accusing the Massachusetts Supreme Court of
"activism" when it held that the Massachusetts Constitution prohibited
banning gay marriage): Meet the Press with Tim Russert (NBC television
broadcast, Mar. 27, 2005) (discussing, at length, the role of courts and judges
in the hotly debated and highly politicized case of Florida patient Terri
Schiavo).
Fueling the outcry of judicial activism, at least one United States
Supreme Court Justice personally subscribes to the view that all so-called
"value-laden" decisions should be left to a democratic majority. See Douglas
Belkin, Scalia Decries Judicial Activism in Harvard Talk, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sep. 29, 2004, at A2 (In his speech at Harvard University, Justice Scalia
remarked, "What I am questioning is the propriety, indeed the sanity, of
having value-laden decisions such as [abortion and assisted suicide] made for
law (and judicial review of legislation) in the American common
law system and thus propounds a flawed limitation on court
power.
The more effective limitation lies in recognizing the power
of the litigants themselves and ensuring their ability to freely invoke
the duties of statute, precedent, policy and equity imposed upon the
judiciary by the American common law system.' Because the
people, as litigants, so directly influence the laws and policies of our
land, the political significance of court argument cannot be denied.
As the Supreme Court has noted, "The judicial system, and in
particular our criminal justice courts, play a vital part in a
democratic state, and the public has a legitimate interest in their
operations.
Further, the judiciary's acknowledgement of the First
Amendment's right "to petition the Government"' '5 compels
recognition of the political nature of speech that seeks redress of
grievances in law, policy or equity. Beginning with the Magna
Carta, the now forgotten "right to petition" is the origin of the
peoples' power to limit government authority by requesting a
change in policy or a review of law, an inherently political device. 
6
the entire society .. by judges .... ").
32. See Belkin, supra note 31: see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare
Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76
N.Y.U. L. REv. 570, 585 (2001) (arguing that "entrenched precedent acquires
a force or weight as a matter of constitutional law" (emphasis in original)).
According to Professor Fallon. the Constitution implicitly validates the
entrenched practice of stare decisis, which in turn legitimizes judicial
decisions. See id. at 582. Indeed, as long as America retains a common law
system, the judiciary will continue to define the law, alter the law, and set rules
of law. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 29. at *69. Further, the idea of judicial
review of legislative action, especially for constitutionality, is an established
role of the judiciary and has evolved into an essential check and balance of the
Legislative power. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
33. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *25; Fallon, supra note 32, at 585
(arguing that the judicial reliance on precedent promotes continuity and
discourages the courts from rethinking every constitutional question).
34. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1035 (1991).
35. U.S. CONST. amend I.
36. See Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The listory and
Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2153, 2161-70 (1998)
(expounding on the early history of the right to petition and its nature as
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The people now exercise this right primarily through petitioning the
courts.!7 Recognizing this reality, the Supreme Court regularly
assures the people that the right to petition guarantees "access" to
the court system.3' By thus conceding that litigants are exercising
their right to petition, the judiciary impliedly recognizes the historic
political nature of speech that adorns the exercise of that right.
The court system provides the fundamental forum by which
the populace may influence, through expression aimed at principles
of law, equity, fairness, social policy and stare decisis, the
application and change of the law."' This includes both arguing for
"political speech"). The history of the right to petition indeed proves its
political nature. See id. The Magna Carta is recognized as beginning the
practice by which English society could limit royal authority through pleas of
equitable treatment, complaints against officials, and requests for change in
policy. See id. at 2163-65. In 1669, England's House of Commons solidified
the right "to prepare and present petitions" and it was included in the first
"Bill of Rights" in 1689, which declared the right of all subjects to petition the
King. See John E. Wolfgram. How the Judiciary Stole the Right to Petition, 31
UWLA L. REV. 257, 279 (2000). As the right grew, it became the primary
political device by which people challenged their authorities, their regulation,
and societal norms, including slavery, taxes, and colonies. See Mark, supra at
2174-95. The political significance culminated in The Declaration of
Independence, itself a list of injuries and grievances, including the failure of
the Crown to address prior petitions. See id. at 2191-95.
37. See Wolfgram, supra note 36, at 281-83 (arguing passionately, in a
somewhat ranting manner, that the Judiciary must recognize that its power is
limited by the right to petition).
38. See Calif. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited. 404 U.S. 508, 510
(1972) (holding that "[t]he right to petition extends to all departments of the
Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the
light of petition").
39. See Mark. supra note 36. After evolving into a practice of actually
delivering written grievances to an early and quite overloaded Congress, the
"petition" soon became synonymous with general "political speech." See id. at
2223-28. Indeed, as Professor Mark eloquently argues, the right to petition
embodied core political speech that should be reflected today in an expansive
interpretation of freedom of expression that does not "stifle the very
expression that the right to petition was meant to protect." See id. at 2155.
Because the right to petition has been adopted as guaranteeing "access" to the
courts, the judiciary must recognize the inherent political speech interest that
attaches to such access. See also Calif Motor Transp. Co., 404 U.S. at 510.
40. See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 668 (1959) (plurality opinion)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (extolling the virtue of a forum in which to freely
change in the common law and arguing for change in the law
promulgated by other branches of the government, which the court
is empowered to review.41 Because the court both identifies new
law and strikes down existing law, the argument of litigants before
it becomes increasingly politically important. For example, the
Brown v. Board of Education42 plaintiffs, who spearheaded as
political a venture as any election campaign or soap-box speech,
directly requested a change in the entire legal and social structure.
41
That it was litigation in court does not make it less so. In fact, the
anti-segregation litigants in Brown specifically chose the courtroom
as the most effective forum for political expression aimed at
redress 4  In a less successful example, defense attorneys for the
famous "Chicago Seven" war protesters strategized to expose abuse
of governmental authority, both in policing the streets and
prosecuting the Vietnam War. 5 In its capacity to hear and rule on
such arguments, the courtroom stands as the place where the
people appeal to the social foundations that underscore legal
norms.4 6  Such appeal is unquestionably political and serious
argue a case). Interestingly. Justice Frankfurter supported a freer hand in
restricting out-of-court speech because the litigant "does not lack for a forum
in which to make his charges of unfairness or failure to adhere to principles of
law; he has ample chance to make such claims to the courts in which he
litigates." Id. To preserve this "ample chance" the litigant must therefore
have some expressive interest in his words before the court.
41. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (declaring the judiciary's
power to apply and interpret the law and ensure its consistency with the
Constitution).
42. 347 tJ.S. 483 (1954).
43. See IRONS, supra note 5, at 381-94 (detailing -the long road to the
Supreme Court for black children" and the entrenched social norms of Jim
Crow).
44. See id. at 383-94 (describing the political strategy of NAACP attorney
Thurgood Marshall in not only picking forums, but litigants themselves, in
order to best champion de-segregation).
45. See id. (noting the political controversy in the Chicago Seven trial
and its contribution to the political movement of the day); see also Carmen
Bell, The Great Experiment: Can Political Speech Survive American
Patriotism (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author)
(discussing the Chicago Seven, Abbie Hoffman and limitations on political
speech during the Vietnam War).
46. See W. Bradley Wendel. Free Speech fbr Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS
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concerns about the power of the people over their government arise
if the court may silence such speech without limit or scrutiny.
This political impact has not gone totally unnoticed. The
Second Circuit, in recognition of the political importance of
courtroom argument, held that Congress could not legislatively
forbid government-funded lawyers from arguing that certain laws
were unconstitutional. Constitutional argument, the court found,
was worthy of core First Amendment political speech concerns:
[A] lawyer's argument to a court that a statute,
rule, or government practice... is
unconstitutional or otherwise illegal falls far
closer to the First Amendment's most
protected categories of speech .... If the idea
in question is the unconstitutionality or
illegality of a governmental rule, the courtroom
is the prime marketplace for the exposure of
that idea.4
This radical brush with populist First Amendment theory is not
broadly accepted.
Expression in court can also influence government in an
opposite manner, urging the court to apply the law instead of
changing or overturning it. Stare decisis and reliance on precedent
as a method of fairness and uniformity provides a mechanism by
which litigants can hold the court to its prior decisions to assure
equal treatment" While the court is often duty bound to follow
prior and higher rulings, it is the speech of the litigants that connect
the facts and policies of precedent to the case at hand) Indeed, the
CONST. L. Q. 305. 354 (discussing the "tradition in our legal culture" of
appealing to societal values behind just legal norms).
47. See Valazquez v. Legal Services Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 771-72 (2d Cir.
1999), aff'd, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
48. Id. The court also noted, "The strongest protection of the First
Amendment's free speech guarantee goes to the right to criticism government
or advocate change in governmental policy." Id. at 771.
49. See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 900-04 (8th Cir.
2000) (providing a brilliant overview of the history and value of adherence to
precedent). iacaied on rehearing en bane. 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
50. See SCHULTZ & SIR1CO, supra note 3, at 2 (outlining the style of
argument that highlights precedent and connects facts of the instant litigants'
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duty of stare decisis lends important political influence to all
litigants, because "obedience to precedent is the only brake on
arbitrary judicial decision-making." '
Finally, the self-interested nature of a private court action
does not deprive courtroom speech of its direct political impact.
Admittedly, courtroom expression does not overtly smack of
politics because it is individual in nature and litigants cannot be free
to use the court as a pulpit for traditional political 
discussion.
Limits such as relevance and justiciability, however, exist to ensure
that issues and parties are properly before the court. Within those
practical confines, a court is often urged to consider societal impact
and treatment of future litigants to ensure equitable policy. For
instance, if a litigant were to urge that stem cell research litigation
be adjudicated under the same standard as abortion, the court will
review the public policy implications of adopting such a standard
and the practical effect on society. The judiciary also welcomes
argument on the broader social and political impact of its decision
through amicus curiae briefs, which turn the court into an arbiter of
the broad social impact of its own power. In this vein, even the
litigant interested in only individual vindication brings with her a
case).
51. Griffy's Landscape Maint. LLC v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 667, 673
(Fed. Cl. 2001) (citing Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.
2000)); see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution:
An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570 (2001)
(explaining stare decisis as a constitutional requirement).
52. See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN. supra note 9. at 22-27.
53. This article uses the term "justiciability" to refer generally to the
tenets of ripeness, mootness. standing, and other prudential limits on
adjudicatory authority. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 28-84 (13th ed. 1991) (outlining the basics of
constitutional authority for federal courts to adjudicate cases).
54. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 3D, § 3975 (1969) (summarizing anicus practice in
Federal Appellate Court). Generally, most amicus argument will be
entertained by the courts as long as they do not repeat the arguments of the
litigants. See Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062,
1063 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that amicus briefs "should normally be allowed"
when the amicus party has a unique perspective beyond the immediate
parties).
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panoply of social and political implications.
B. First Socrates, then Cable News: The Influence of Courtroom
Argument on Political Debate.
Courtroom argument also contributes unmistakable value
to the political marketplace of ideas . Speech in court often
channels directly into public debate, where it profoundly impacts
upon popular policy decisions. ' Especially with the advent of C-
SPAN, Court TV, CNN, MSNBC and the twenty-four hour news
cycle, argument before the judiciary, including the Supreme Court
level, contributes instantly to the widespread mulling of social
policy) 7 Argument on rules of law, constitutional issues, defense
55. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (eloquently coining the now famous value of free speech). Justice
Holmes, disagreeing with the criminal convictions of publishers of anti-
American pamphlets, stated:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more
than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market...
Id. at 630.
56. See EDWARD J. LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS: THE SCOPES
TRIAL AND AMERICA'S CONTINUING DEBATE OVER SCIENCE AND RELIGION
170-93 (1997) (analyzing, in depth, the arguments made by William Jennings
Bryan and Clarence Darrow): see also Edward J. Larson. The Scopes Trial and
the Evolving Concept of Freedom, 85 VA. L. REV. 503. 519 (1999) (furthering
the case for the link between the Scopes trial and public debate over religion
because of the "intense public attention" focused on the trial and its
arguments). Darrow's argument-that new scientific theory can freely
challenge religious fundamentalism- could hardly be kept out of the public
debate. See id. at 519-20. A new idea of freedom of belief emerged and
gained sympathy. See id.
57. See, e.g., The Abrams Report, (MSNBC television broadcast, Sept. 10.
2004) [hereinafter The Abrams Report] (discussing daily arguments put forth
in current court cases, including intense discussion on issues of legislation and
the legal system raised by such arguments). Broadcasts such as The Abrams
Report instantly and undeniably affect popular debate, which is evidenced
immediately on such programs by the thousands of emails from viewers that
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theories and litigant's rights are served up for public consumption,
often with contemporaneous commentaries by lawyers, scholars
and policy-makers that augment the political significance of such
argument."8 The Internet, as it has with all information, also offers
unprecedented availability to courtroom speech, broadcasting
argument, making briefs widely available, and opening yet another
all-access door to public consumption of courtroom argument.
form positions on legal, social and political issues based on what they see and
hear. See id. (broadcasting and critiquing some of these viewer comments).
Generally, the political influence of media broadcasts has not gone unnoticed,
leading to the assessment that the airwaves have supplanted the traditional
forums of public parks and streets for delivery of political speech. See also
David Cardone, Tlhe 'Dread of Tyrants': Defending the Free-Speech Rights of
Independent Political Candidates, PA. LAW., May/June 2004, at 14, 20 (arguing
that current First Amendment standards applied to televised campaign
debates are outdated because the airwaves are "today's traditional public
forum").
58. See The Abrams Report, supra note 57 (exporting legal debate for
public consumption); see also Supreme Court Hears Affirmative Action
Argiuments, CNN, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/04/01/scotus.affirmative.action/ (Apr. 2, 2003)
(reporting and analyzing oral argument on the landmark affirmative action
cases challenging the Michigan Law School and the University of Michigan
undergraduate racial preference programs). A critical political component of
such oral argument digestion is the side taken by the government on
controversial issues. See id. For instance, President George W. Bush's
administration weighed in against the Michigan affirmative action programs.
See id. This side-taking then became part of the debate over the policies of
the Bush administration during the ensuing 2004 presidential election. See
The McLaughlin Group (PBS television broadcast. July 24. 2004), transcript
available at http://www.mclaughlin.com/library/transcript.asp'?id=424
(broadcasting a roundtable discussion over whether the President's policies
and positions in the affirmative action cases would factor in the pending
election).
59. See, e.g., Wisconsin Court System, Supreme Court Oral Arguments,
Listen to an Oral Argument Online, at
http://www.wicourts.gov/opinions/soralarguments.htm (last modified Sept. 29,
2004) (offering live and recorded Wisconsin Supreme Court arguments to the
public for free from 1997 to present); Oyez, U.S. Supreme Court Multimedia,
at http://www.oyez.org (last visited Feb. 8, 2005) (offering various U.S.
Supreme Court oral arguments to the public for downloading). A testament
to the eagerness of the public to digest these arguments, the OYEZ website
offers a "most popular audiofile" list that indicates that several hundred
thousand visitors have downloaded various Supreme Court oral arguments.
Cable news and technology, however, cannot take all the
credit for the political significance of courtroom argument.'
Indeed, the contribution of courtroom argument to public political
debate ages with Western Civilization itself. In Athens, around 800
B.C., prosecutors gave Greek philosopher and rabble-rouser
Socrates the right to defend himself at a public trial. ' "Public"
trials in Athens were quite literally that - Socrates had over 500
jurors - and the nuances of trial arguments spread instantly.
2
Socrates took advantage, and his defense oratory railed against the
Athenian state and its refusal to recognize the peoples' right to
question their governance, their gods, and just about everything
else."' Although his executioners were probably unimpressed,
Socrates' courtroom speech sounded in the political psyche of the
Athenian masses, which began to stir with questions, and the
speech went on to influence political thought for nearly three
millennia. 4
Current western-style judicial proceedings, without as much
hemlock, share such public influence, with arguments laid bare for
See id.
60. See The Abrams Report, supra note 57 (marketing itself as "The
Program About Justice," with certain implication that it is the lone source for
courtroom analysis).
61. SeeTHOMAS R. MARTIN, ANCIENT GREECE: FROM PREHISTORIC TO
HELLENIST ic TIMES 170-73 (1996) (recounting the details of the prosecution of
Socrates and his speech in his own defense).
62. See id.: see also PLATO, THE LAST DAYS OF SOCRATES 16 (Hugh
Tredennick, trans., Penguin Books 1993) (1954) (describing the Athenian
public's zest for debate and critique of court argument).
63. See id. at 37-67 (section titled The Apology, reporting Socrates' last
public speech that summarized his own existence as a "gadfly" to the state and
the preconceptions of its people, especially its rulers, and rejecting traditional
notions of government and religion).
64. See MARTIN, supra note 61, at 170-73. Indeed, Socrates' "apology"
(as written by Plato) is generally an early jumping off point for the student of
modern political philosophy, followed by its progeny, Plato's T"he Republic
and Aristotle's Politics. See Introduction to Plato Selections, in PRINCETON
READINGS IN POLITICAL THOUGHF 19 (Mitchell Cohen & Nicole Fermon eds.,
1996) (summarizing the influence of Socrates on Plato and modern western
political philosophy, and introducing The Apology). It is not a stretch to say
this courtroom speech is one of the earliest influences on the whole of western
political philosophy.
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consumption by the body politic as a component in its
determination of political direction.6  Courtroom expression is
intentionally public in nature, with all court documents available to
the public and often brought forth by the news-media. 6 In fact, the
media championed the idea of a public trial into a heavily protected
constitutional right.", The right allows the people to maintain
vigilance over the judiciary." Thus, the media ensures that the
channel through which the public digests courtroom speech remains
open. Through this increasingly more effective channel, arguments
in court flow outside the courthouse walls to compete in the
traditional political marketplace of ideas."
The political importance of such competition is undeniable.
No example of such political impact is more stark than the effect of
courtroom arguments arising from the 2000 Presidential Election,
arguments that brought the Constitution and the electoral process
into the forefront of national debate. 7" Not unlike the trial of
Socrates, the American people hung on the litigants' every word
and every brief. Nearly every major radio and television station
65. Put simpler, the people, upon whom the state relies for government,
scrutinize and debate court proceedings as a component in determining the
direction of government.
66. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
67. See, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
68. See id.
69. See Abrams v. Jnited States. 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (citing the value of competition of ideas through free trade in
expression).
70. See Bush, Gore Briefy Preview Oral Argumet ts at U.S. Supreme
Cou rt, CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITCS/stories/12/10/
president.election/ (Dec. 11, 2000) (summarizing the arguments offered by the
litigants). That day, the public debated no less than the foundations of
democracy, as laid out by the arguments of the litigants, Bush and Gore:
In briefs filed Sunday afternoon with the U.S. Supreme
Court, attorneys for Republican George W. Bush
argue the latest ballot recount in Florida is
unconstitutional and will undermine confidence in the
election process, while attorneys for Democrat Al
Gore say the counting of all legal ballots is "essential
to our democracy."
Id.
71. See U.S. Supreme Couirt Cases: Election 2000, C-SPAN, at
broadcast the Bush v. Gore72 oral arguments before the Florida and
U.S. Supreme Courts. 73 Analysts and political pundits then used
those arguments in both contemporaneous and post-mortem
analysis about the election of the United States President. 4 Indeed,
in 2004, the Bush v. Gore arguments still rippled in political debate,
as the American people grappled with another closely matched
presidential election and unprecedented efforts to monitor the polls
were set in place . Such direct contributions to the most important
political discourse-the presidential election-solidify the serious
political significance of courtroom speech.76
Further, the Supreme Court itself thrust courtroom
proceedings into the public debate. The Court repeatedly asserts
that trials, especially criminal, must be "subject to
contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion. The
political issues and arguments in pending court cases have been
http://www.c-span.org/campaign2000/Florida/ussupcourt.asp (last visited Feb.
9, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review) (providing the public
with a contemporaneous and exhaustive database of arguments related to all
stages of the court battles following the 2000 Election, including briefs, reply
briefs, court opinions, and oral arguments).
72. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
73. See Press Release, Senator Charles E. Shumer, Grassley, Schumer:
Televised Federal trials, (June 5, 2001), available at
http://schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press-releases/PR0059
4.html (recounting the impact of the Florida Supreme Court and U.S.
Supreme Court audio broadcasts of the Bush v. Gore arguments in order to
garner support for a bill that would guarantee televised federal trials).
74. See, e.g., David Von Drehle, Analysis: Nine Decisive Votes, Deep
Political Peril. WASH. POST. Dec. 12, 2000, at 1A (discussing the details of the
oral argument and critiquing Supreme Court positions and the election
process); see also Daniel Okrent. "Get me Boies!", TtME, Dec. 25, 2000. at 104
(outlining the political impact Al Gore's election attorney David Boies has
had with his legal arguments).
75. See Press Release, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law,
Lawyers Prepared to Protect Voters' Rights During Primary (Aug. 30, 2004).
available at http://www.lawyerscomm.org/publications/press/press083004.html
(detailing efforts by nation wide civil rights organization to monitor the 2004
presidential elections in Florida).
76. See id.
77. [n re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1948); see also Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 598 (1980).
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called "the most important topics of discussion" in public debate.7'
Upon this platform, expression in the courtroom proves to be
political speech of the most fundamental type, both taking part in
and influencing robust political debate.
Lastly, the fact that all courtroom speech is not socially
charged or consumed by the public does not lessen its political
value. The above contributions warrant recognition of courtroom
speech as politically important enough to require concern with its
unchecked limitation." Indeed, many times, court-speech may be
fully recognized as political speech of the most critical type.)8 Of
course, for all the Brown-like cases that carry dire political
implications, the judiciary hears hundreds of "slip-and-fall" cases
where arguments do not harbor obvious political importance. It is
unnecessary to decide whether every argument before every court
is political speech. The traditional town-hall meeting is not less
protected because it does not always result in rousing political
discourse.' For the purposes of this Article, one need only
recognize the potential political concerns that speech in court
evoke. From those concerns arise the First Amendment interest in
the content of courtroom argument.
III. "YOU'RE OUT OF ORDER! THIS WHOLE TRIAL IS OUT OF
ORDER!"' - THE JUDICIARY IGNORES THE CORE PROTECTIONS
OF POLITICAL SPEECH IN THE COURTROOM
Lawyerly frustrations aside, one cannot seriously argue that
melodrama-weary judges must endure screaming courtroom
tirades, such as that of Al Pacino's character in And Justice for All,
78. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1035 (1991) (quoting
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268 (1941)).
79. For further discussion of the political implications of courtroom
speech, see supra notes 23-81 and accompanying text.
80. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 9, at 20-28, 78-120 (explaining the vital
role of political speech).
81. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 9, at 24-29 (discussing the "town-hall"
idea).
82. AND JUSTICE FOR ALL (Columbia Pictures 1979) (depicting Al
Pacino's character, Arthur Kirkland, reaching the climax of frustration with
court procedure and injustice).
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because such tirades might be political." The many differences of
the court system require that it cannot be answerable to the people
as a forum for expression in all similarity to its legislative and
executive counterparts." The court system contains hundreds of
rules that limit argument. The rules of evidence, jurisdiction, and
standing, for instance, cannot be void merely because they preclude
relevant, sometimes political, argument)'5 As discussed below,
however, the incoherent struggle to treat the courtroom as a forum
for expression has thus far left litigants exposed to arbitrary
limitation without any concern whatsoever for the litigants' right to
control their own arguments.' This lack of consistency results in
startling restraint of politically important expression that escapes
constitutional scrutiny under the guise of administrative necessity.8
7
A. Hodge Podge: The Struggle with the Courtroom as a Forum for
Expression
First Amendment rights retained by a litigant participating
in the judicial process are inconsistent at best and non-existent at
worst."' Often, the potentially vast political implications of
courtroom speech remain at risk because the judiciary is
uncomfortable applying the First Amendment to itself.
Preliminarily, it is generally understood that the court must exercise
tight control over speech before it to ensure preservation of the
83. See id. (shattering courtroom decorum but pointing out the
helplessness of litigants when faced with the arbitrary and sometimes blatantly
unjust results of litigation). As many trial lawyers know, melodrama is at once
the bane and best-friend of the argument.
84. For a discussion of the attempts to apply the First Amendment to the
forum of the courtroom. see infra notes 82-127 and accompanying text.
85. For a discussion of the balance between courtroom control and
freedom of political expression, see infra notes 189-201 and accompanying
text.
86. For a discussion of such standards, see infra notes 82-127 and
accompanying text.
87. For a discussion of examples that indicate the lack of proper
constitutional respect for courtroom speech, see in' a Section III.B.
88. See W. Bradley Wendel. Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. 305, 305, 313 (2001) (describing "doctrinal confusion" among
courts dealing with lawyer free speech issues).
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judicial process." On the other hand, most courts also recognize
that "attorneys ... do not lose their constitutional rights at the
courthouse door."'  Yet primarily because courtroom argument
takes place in such an inherently circumscribed forum, courts are
uneasy applying traditional "forum" analysis and apply only vague
standards based on even more vague ideas.)' This incoherence
opens the door to arbitrary and non-uniform restrictions of
courtroom speech.
Most criticism and opinion in the area of court-restricted
speech arises in the context of prior restraint of attorney speech
outside the courtroom and protective orders against the press."
Because any "prior restraint" of speech is the "least tolerable"
restriction of speech, the Supreme Court initially required a "clear
and present danger" to the judicial process before restricting extra-
judicial attorney speech." Later, however, the Court reversed itself
and the pendulum quickly swung in favor of a much more lenient
standard, even for prior restraints, with only a "substantial
89. See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 8 (1951). The Court stated:
[Zealous advocacy] can pervert as well as aid the
judicial process unless it is supervised and controlled
by a neutral judge representing the overriding social
interest in impartial justice and with power to curb
both adversaries .... [The court must] possess and
frequently exert power to curb prejudicial and
excessive zeal of prosecutors.
Id.
90. Levine v. United States Dist. Court for Central Dist. of Cal., 764 F.2d
590, 595 (9th Cir. 1985): see also Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20.
32-33 (1984).
91. See Sacher, 343 U.S. at 8-9.
92. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358-63 (1966) (citing the
dangers of immense publicity and the ability of the trial court to protect the
judicial process): see also Erwin Chernerinsky, Silence is Not Golden:
Protecting Lawyer Speech Under the First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859
(1998) (reviewing primarily the attorney's right to speak about ongoing legal
matters and offering protective solutions for the problems of prior restraint).
93. Neb. Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (finding that a prior
restraint of speech outside the courtroom regarding the trial would only be
valid if the trial court found a clear and present danger to the defendant's right
to a fair trial). This holding stemmed from almost total distrust of prior
restraints in any fashion. See id.
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likelihood" of prejudice needed .
Speech inside the courtroom fares much worse. Even
though the accepted first step in reviewing speech made on
government property usually requires determining "the nature of1 5
the forum," this step is often skipped. Most courts theorize that an
attorney's role as an "officer of the court" automatically subjects
her to some implied court power to curb speech." In supporting
great latitude of a court to regulate attorney speech, Justice
Frankfurter in In Re Sawyer wrote:
An attorney actively engaged in the conduct of
a trial is not merely another citizen. He is an
intimate and trusted and essential part of the
machinery of justice, an 'officer of the court' in
the most compelling sense.
Such a glorified marionette can have no objection to the whims of
its venerable master.
The commonly recognized distinction holds that the closer
an attorney gets to the courtroom, the more restrictions on speech
become permissible.)'  Accordingly, the fairly strong protections
94. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (setting the current
standard). Indicative of the Court's typical difficulty when it applies the First
Amendment to itself, the Gentile Court fractured into many differing
opinions. See id.
95. See Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985) (outlining the
process for determining whether speech restrictions on government property
are valid); see also Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 965-
66 (9th Cir. 2002) (determining that a courthouse building was a -non-public"
forum and therefore restrictions on speech within the building would be
upheld if reasonable in light of the forum's purpose and are viewpoint
neutral).
96. See Kuiper v. Dist. Court, 632 P.2d 694. 697 (Mont. 1981); In re
Hinds, 449 A.2d 483. 489 (N.J. 1982); State ex. rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Porter,
766 P.2d 958, 968 (Okla. 1988).
97. See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 668 (1959) (plurality opinion)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
98. See David R. Cooper, Note, Speaking Out: Lawyers and Their Right
to Free Speech, 18 REV. Lrri(i. 671. 683 (1999) ("Clearly, any conception of the
lawyer as an officer of the court steadily diminishes the further he moves away
from the courtroom .... ): Kathleen K. McGinn, Note, Zal v. Steppe: Ninth
Circuit Approval of an In Limine Ban of Specific Words, 23 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REV. 35, 51-52 (1993) (outlining what she calls "A Limited Protection
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afforded attorney speech outside the courtroom are not extended to
speech inside the courtroom. For instance, reviewing sanctions
against a lawyer for holding a press conference after the indictment
of his client, the Supreme Court in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevaa
held that extra-judicial limits must be "designed to protect the
integrity and fairness of a State's judicial system" and must impose
only "narrow and necessary limitations on lawyers' speech." [0'
Ominously, however, the Gentile Court distinguished in-court
speech as "extremely circumscribed" and stated that no judge's
ruling may be verbally resisted beyond what is necessary to
preserve appeal."' Some courts have used Gentile to eliminate
virtually all First Amendment protections in favor of absolute
judicial power to "circumscribe" courtroom speech .
On the other hand, even this "extreme" circumscription
does not necessarily foreclose a First Amendment expression
interest in controlling the content of argument. The Court has
repeatedly assured litigants that they "do not 'surrender their First
Amendment rights at the courthouse door,"' implying that parties
retain some freedom of expression despite the highly controlled
atmosphere of a court case." Also, at least one Supreme Court
View").
99. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
100. Id. at 1075 (Rehnquist, C.J., delivering the opinion of the Court with
respect to Parts I and ii only). Gentile established a balancing test to measure
a court's restrictions on litigant speech: First Amendment interests against
"the State's legitimate interest in regulating the activity in question." Gentile,
501 U.S. at 1075. Without specifically defining a level of scrutiny, the Gentile
Court proceeded with exacting analysis, pointing out the State's "fundamental
interest" in fair trial by "impartial jurors" and a "narrowly tailored" restraint
aimed at only speech "likely to have a materially prejudicial effect." See id. at
1075-76 (upholding the constitutionality of the Nevada rule).
101. Id. at 1071.
102. See Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 927-29 (9th Cir. 1992).
103. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1073 (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,
467 U.S. 20, 32-33 n.18 (1984) (quoting In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 186 (D.C.
Cir. 1979))). With regard to attorney speech, the Court has often implied that
the First Amendment cannot be forgotten. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,
515 U.S. 618, 634 (1995) (reminding litigants that there are circumstances in
which attorney speech requires "the strongest protection our Constitution has
to offer"); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32-33 n.18 (1984)
(holding that restriction on communications during trial are appropriate
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opinion has implied further, combining free speech with the First
Amendment's almost dormant right "to petition the
Government.', 1 4 In Sacher v. United States, 15 the Court held that it
was "the right of ... every litigant to press his claim, even if it
appears farfetched and untenable, to obtain the court's considered
ruling."'' Even the speech-limiting Gentile pluralities, concurring
and dissenting, relied on Sacher as valid precedent." The Sacher
Court found that rowdy conduct and speech by an advocate during
trial was only sanctionable to the extent the lawyer's actions "make
"where necessary to ensure a fair trial ....- ): In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432
(1978) (stating that punishing a lawyer for political expression requires
"exacting scrutiny"). With these rulings, and sometimes dicta, the Court has
kept the First Amendment close to the courtroom, but has been reluctant to
wholly lower itself to fully recognize the courtroom as a forum for speech.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The First Amendment right to petition the
government for redress of grievances is generally limited to the right to
demand exercise of the Government's powers, including the judicial branch.
See Calif. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508. 510 (1.972)
(holding that "the right to petition extends to all departments of the
Government"). Although interpretation of the modern clause has not been
extended to protect the content of such petitions, the clause's progenitors,
England's House of Commons in 1669, did recognize a certain inherent right
to control the content of a petition, declaring that all the King's subjects had
"the inherent right to prepare and present petitions." See Findlaw, Rights of
Assembly and Petition, at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data
constitution/amendment0l/21.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2005) (on file with the
First Amendment Law Review).
The right to petition is indeed a well-spring of support for the argument
that the people must be in control of their arguments before the Court. In
arguing for its adoption into the Constitution, the Anti-federalist supporters of
the right saw the petition not as a plea for redress to a higher power, but the
demands of "a free people [to] their servants." PHILADELPHIENSiS, No. 5,
reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANII-FEDERALIST 117 (Herbert J. Storing ed.,
1981) (expounding the anonymous writings of Anti-federalism at the creation
of the Constitution). IThe Court, in deeming itself to be an outlet for the right
to petition, has thus recognized its role as a "servant" to the free people, and
thus should not have monarch-like control over the content of the petitions
before it. See Ca/if Motor fransp. Co., 404 U.S. at 510 (holding that the right
to petition extends to all branches of government, including the judiciary).
105. 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
106. Id. at 9.
107. See Gentile. 501 U.S. at 1071.
impossible an orderly and speedy dispatch of the case.""' Similar
later cases also reversed contempt convictions for a pro se litigant
hurling accusations of bias at the court " ' and for a witness' vulgar
name-calling during cross-examination, primarily because the
insults were not an "imminent ... threat to the administration of
justice. '.".. At least one Circuit Court judge considers these
holdings in the posture of First Amendment expression in the
courtroom:
[Supreme Court] holdings provide broad
latitude for the use of language during a trial.
They protect abusive and even obscene
language in no way connected to the substance
of a litigant's case. A fortiori, they indicate that
the First Amendment protects vigorous speech
closely connected with the case being
litigated."'
While it is unclear and not yet adopted, there seems at least
some room in Supreme Court jurisprudence for a First Amendment
interest in the substance of courtroom argument."' Conversely,
108. Sacher, 343 U.S. at 3-4 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d
201, 225 (2d Cir. 1950)).
109. See In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 554-55 (1972).
110. Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 698 (1974) (quoting Craig v.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947)).
111. Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 935 (9th Cir. 1992) (Noonan, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Noonan disagreed with the
majority's assumption of total power over courtroom language. He agreed
with the majority that the defendant violated the trial court's word-ban, but
found that the defendant did not act unprofessionally in resisting the order
because he had legitimate reasons for challenging the word-ban as overbroad.
In Judge Noonan's view, the court's holding of the defendant in contempt
went beyond its order regarding the use of non-banned words.
112. Doctrinally, however, reconciling such cases with Sacher and
Gentile's "no resistance beyond preserving appeal" has led to the confusing
separation of review of rulings for First Amendment violations from review of
contempt orders. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1071 (holding, "An attorney may
not, by speech or other conduct, resist a ruling of the trial court beyond the
point necessary to preserve a claim for appeal"); Sacher, 343 U.S. at 8. The
theory is that once a ruling is issued, review for constitutionality may be
preserved by appeal, and if an attorney resists the ruling, improper or not, he
is in contempt. Therefore, the "obstruct the administration of justice"
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though, courts are tempted to distinguish the Sacher and similar
rulings as dealing with specific forms of contempt convictions, and
ignore the First Amendment implications. 1 '
The few rare cases that have applied forum analysis to the
courtroom are entirely inconsistent. Holding that a bailiff does not
have a right to preach in the courtroom, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana declared sweepingly and
without nuance that "a courtroom is not a public forum or a
designated public forum" because it "is not a debate hall or a
gathering place for the public to exchange ideas."' 1 On the other
hand, courts regularly refer to the courtroom as a "traditional
public forum" when ruling on issues involving the press.5 Some
have also used forum analysis to protect litigants' speech during
proceedings. Even within this "full protection" view, however,
courts are unclear on how the interest applies to the litigation itself
apart from actual speech in court."
standard of Sacher and the vulgarity cases may be distinguished because a
contempt order was issued summarily (without a violation of a prior ruling).
See id. at 928 (holding that summary criminal contempt orders can only limit
speech when the speech is an immediate threat to the judicial process, but
when a litigant is subject to a court order that limits speech, his only remedy is
appeal); see also McGinn, supra note 98, at 49-50 (describing the contempt
order issue).
113. See, e.g., Zal, 968 F.2d at 928 (distinguishing Sacher and In re Little
as dealing only with summary contempt orders and upholding the idea that if a
ruling is adverse, any resistance beyond preserving appeal is contempt).
114. Kelly v. Mun. Ct. of Marion County, 852 F. Supp. 724, 734-35 (S.D.
Ind. 1994) (failing to recognize the traditional expression that goes on in a
courtroom by the litigants at least, if not by the bailiffs).
115. See O'Leary v. Vill. of Elmhurst. No. 86 C 997, 1989 WL 18333. at
*2, *6 (N.D. 111. 1989) (referring to the courtroom as a *traditional" public
forum and a public source of information that may be obtainable by the
press); Okla. Publ'g Co. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 1255, 1258 (W.D. Okla.
1981) (referring to the right of the press to "report events that take place in
the public forum of the courtroom").
116. See, e.g., In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (generally
discussing participants in the judicial process while holding that a court could
not arbitrarily prohibit disclosure of discovery materials). In Halkin,
reviewing a gag on discovery disclosure to third parties, the District of
Columbia Circuit stated: "Litigation itself is a form of expression protected by
the First Amendment. It is indisputable that attorneys and parties retain their
First Amendment rights even as participants in the judicial process." Id. In
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Two illustrative decisions applied differing forum analysis to
the courtroom but recognized the traditionally expressive nature of
the courtroom. In Velazquez v. Legal Serv. Corp.' a divided
Second Circuit panel, without specifically identifying a public
forum, held that Congress impermissibly employed viewpoint
discrimination when Congress prohibited legal services attorneys
from making constitutional arguments.' Importantly, the
Velazquez majority stated that the courtroom is the "prime
marketplace" for making constitutional argument and recognized
the litigants' speech interest in being able to freely make such
argument.",' Daring more specific analysis, the New York Supreme
Court in Frankel v. Roberts2" held that defense counsel had a First
Amendment right during trial to wear a button bearing the political
slogan, "Ready To Strike."'' 2' Uniquely, the court successfully
applied early forum-style reasoning outlined by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford,'21 which upheld a public
school anti-noise regulation by asking "whether the manner of
expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a
particular place at a particular time."' '  Accordingly, the political
button did not interfere with "the normal activity and operation" of
1984, the Second Circuit held that CNN, which sought to place cameras in the
courtroom, could not assert a "public forum" First Amendment claim, stating,
"Whatever public forum interest may exist in litigation, that interest is clearly
a speaker's interest, not an interest in access to the courtroom."
Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys.. Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1984)
(holding that "it has never been suggested that there is a link between the
First Amendment interest that a litigant has in his trial as a 'form of
expression' and the right that the public may have to view that expression on
television"). Nevertheless, the Second Circuit seemed to agree that the
courtroom was a public forum for the litigants themselves. See id.
117. 164 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1999).
118. Id. at 771-72 (ruling that constitutional argument has close ties to
traditional political speech and noting that "the suit-for-benefits exception is
viewpoint discrimination subject to strict First Amendment scrutiny").
119. Id.
120. 165 A.D.2d 382 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
121. id. at 384-86.
122. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
123. id. at 116.
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a bench trial.'24 Furthering the forum analysis, the Court also
reasoned that the trial judge employed an improper "content-
based" restriction, because the judge later admitted that a "Save
the Whales" button would have been fine.' While not needing to
equate the courtroom to a public park, these two decisions are
significant because they indicate that a First Amendment forum
analysis can work in the courtroom without sacrificing vital
practical limitations. " No other court, however, has been willing to
make this leap.
No court, state or federal, has come close to any uniform
First Amendment standard to protect the political importance of
courtroom argument. Possibilities remain for some protection, but
have not yet been exploited because the forum is so absolutely
regulated by the judiciary. As the next Section will illustrate,
trusting the judiciary to assume such total control of this politically
charged speech ignores the ideal of a free people in control of their
own government and the petitions before it. 2
B. Trusting Too Much In the Judiciary? Arbitrary Speech
Prohibitions in the Courtroom that Raise Political Speech Concerns
Without the bother of a First Amendment interest in the
content of courtroom argument, courts freely limit argument
without even thinking about traditional speech implications. This
freedom has spawned judicial limitations of courtroom speech that
run afoul of traditional First Amendment principles and ignore the
warning that government cannot simply "be trusted" when it comes
to politically important speech.'9 ' The following two examples
indicate that the judicial branch fails to respect the political value of
courtroom speech and its role as a government branch subject to
124. Frankel, 165 A.D.2d at 384-85.
125. See id. at 385-86 (the objectionable words were "Ready to Strike,"
but the trial judge admitted that he would have no problem with a "Save the
Whales" button worn in court).
126. See id.
127. For a discussion of examples, see infra Section 111.13.
128. See id.
129. See id.
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the self-governing people.'" While there are literally hundreds of
procedural and substantive rules that limit argument, these
examples illustrate that a speech interest would protect against
arbitrary abuses that ignore the courtroom as a forum for
traditional political expression.
1. In Limine Word-Bans
The most creative, and therefore most disturbing, use of
judicial power to curb courtroom speech has come in the form of
banning the utterance of specific, generic words.' In Zal v.
Steppe,'3  the Ninth Circuit upheld a District Court ruling that
banned, prior to trial, a defense attorney from using 50 specific
words in defending abortion protesters.'13 The words forbidden by




130. For further discussion of examples, see inifra notes 131-176 and
accompanying text. These examples merely provide a clear indication of the
lack of respect paid by the judiciary to the traditional political interests of
litigants in freely arguing before the court, but they are not the only such
possibilities. For example, in Vclazquez v. Legal Serv. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 771
(2d Cir. 1999), the court addressed a legislatively mandated rule that legal
services lawyers were precluded from making constitutional challenges to
certain laws. The judiciary could easily adopt such a rule or apply such
limitation to its court appointed or pro bono counsel.
131. See generally McGinn, supra note 98 (discussing word bans and
contempt orders for violating them). Motions In Limine for word-bans are
not rare before the judiciary. See, e.g., Cook v. Phila. Transp. Co., 199 A.2d
446, 447 (Pa. 1964) (holding that forbidding attorneys from using the name
"Crazy Bar," a store name relevant to the case, was appropriate because the
court believed the name carried unnecessarily prejudicial connotation). Most
attorneys are familiar with motions precluding reference to certain facts or
certain legal theories based on evidentiary grounds. These motions, though,
usually do not seek preclusion of entire sections of the English language, as in
Zal.
132. 968 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1992).
133. Id. at 925.
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decimation thug eradication'
4
The trial court reasoned that these words could be used to
refer to precluded defenses, which attorney Zal had a reputation
for arguing in attempts to emotionally sway the jury.' 3  Using
Gentile, the Ninth Circuit found Zal's courtroom speech could be
'extremely circumscribed" because "the trial judge is charged with
preserving the decorum that permits a reasoned resolution of
issues." ' In an assertion of power, the court thumbed its nose at
its own duty to heed the First Amendment, adding that, "Zealous
counsel cannot flout that authority behind the shield of the First
Amendment.",
37
Given the political implications of courtroom speech,
prescribing use of general words gives rise to several First
Amendment concerns. First, words are the tools that attorneys use
to obtain the court's considered ruling.' 3' With the power to forbid
utterance of words themselves, a court can stifle courtroom speech
to the extent it precludes zealous advocacy."'  With such a
limitation, the political influence on the court itself and on the
public debate is at risk."" If the court can limit words without any
scrutiny at all, it can effectively shield itself from unpopular, yet
relevant, ideas. In Cohen v. Califtrnia14t the Supreme Court spoke
sweepingly against banning words themselves because the practice
inherently bans ideas:
[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that
one can forbid particular words without also
running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas
in the process. Indeed, governments might
134. Id.
1135. Id. at 925-26.
136. Id. at 928-29.
137. Id. at 929.
138. See McGinn, supra note 98, at 64-65 (offering some basic concerns
about word-bans).
139. See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 665-69 (1959) (plurality opinion)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (finding that lawyers need an "ample chance" to
make claims).
140. For further discussion of the political impact of courtroom speech.,
see supra notes 23-81 and accompanying text.
141. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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soon seize upon the censorship of particular
words as a convenient guise for banning the
expression of unpopular views.
42
Trusting the judicial branch of government with free reign
over ideas, even in the circumscribed forum of the courtroom, is
dangerous to a free society as it undermines political impact and the- - 343
semblance of self-government. Indeed, it is these ideas that are
the focus of First Amendment first principles. 14 4 In the Brown
litigation or the Chicago Seven trials, the inadequacies of the
government itself were part of the arguments. Following the Zal
principal, a court uneasy about such socio-structural arguments
could limit the scope of relevant argument by simply banning
certain words that might refer to something irrelevant or
emotionally swaying. The Brown arguments exposed the
inherently detrimental effect of segregation, a controversial and
emotional argument.146 If the Brown court had banned the words
142. Id. at 26.
143. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 9, at 28 ("To be afraid of ideas, any
idea, is to be unfit for self-government. Any such suppression of ideas about
the common good, the First Amendment condemns with its absolute
disapproval."). The political importance of language is not lost upon political
philosophers, who have thoroughly examined how specific words can be used
to achieve impact. See George Orwell, Politics and the English Language, in
PRINCETON READINGS IN POLItICAL THot( 3Ht: ESSEN'TIAL TEXiS SINCE
PLATO 591 (Mitchell Cohen & Nicole Fermon, eds., 1996) (analyzing-with
some sarcasm-words and phrases that are used to generate political
influence, often without saying much at all). Orwell. who was concerned with
government power to distract and disinform. argued that eliminating bad
habits in the English language could help us think more clearly, "and to think
more clearly is a necessary first step towards political regeneration." Id.
144. See Velazquez v. Legal Serv. Corp.. 164 F.3d 757, 771-72 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding that the courtroom is the best "marketplace" for argument that
the rules or laws of the government are unconstitutional or illegal).
145. See IRONS, supra note 5, at 388-94 (recounting the civil rights
challenge to the wide-spread law of Jim Crow segregation). As an indication
of the breadth of the change that the Brown litigants sought, by Kansas law
the plaintiff's attorneys, one black and one white, could not eat, sleep or bathe
in the same facilities before the trial. See id. at 389.
146. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("To separate
[African Americans] from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
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"race," "white," and "black" from use by Thurgood Marshall, the
Brown litigation would have been difficult, perhaps impossible.
47
Although the same arguments may have been formed by referring
only to "segregation," a powerful argument would have been
eviscerated by a court with racist, or even simply overly cautious,
motives. 4 While such prohibition seems now unreasonable, in 1954
it was not uncommon to encounter entire government structures
that were bent on making racial integration impossible. 14 It would
be naive to assume that some judges did not sympathize.15' This
healthy democratic mistrust, combined with the vital political role
of courtroom argument, demands First Amendment scrutiny.
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.").
147. See, e.g., Alan L. Yatvin, Facts to Know, Tell On Landmark Case,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 17, 2004, at 5, 7 (enumerating and analyzing the
details and evidence used for the Brown arguments). Among the evidence
was a powerful and controversial study done by Dr. Kenneth Clark that
offered "white dolls" and "black dolls" to African-American children to see
which they had been taught to prefer. Id. at 7.
148. See id.
149. See IRONS, stipra note 5, at 400-10 (discussing the entrenched
resistance to Brown and the extremist positions taken by many members from
Southern governments).
150. See, e.g., IRONS. supra note 5, at 387 (noting some judges that were
defenders of white supremacy and explaining the judicial prejudices a case like
Brown could encounter). It is almost certain that Marshall and his fellow
NAACP civil rights advocates did face racial bias in the judiciary as they
argued their way from the trial courts through the appellate courts. In fact, in
all the segregation cases that were joined together by the Supreme Court
under the Browni caption. only one lower court judge had ruled against
segregation, Delaware Court of Chancery Judge Collins J. Seitz. See Jennifer
Batchelor. Collins J. Seit: Sr. Defled Convention and Ried ftr the Underdog,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 17, 2004, at 3 (commemorating the bravery and
egalitarianism of Judge Seitz, who wrote the only decision affirmed by the
Supreme Court in Brown). Many feared prejudice even on the Supreme
Court Bench, especially from Chief Justice Fred Vinson, known for his
support of segregation. See Tony Mauro, On the Right Side of History: A Look
at Philip Elman, LEGAL INTELLIGEN(ER, May 17, 2004, at 4 (recounting the
prospective Court vote with Vinson included). When Justice Vinson suddenly
died in late 1953, civil rights supporter Justice Felix Frankfurter is reported to
have enthusiastically announced, "T]his is the first solid piece of evidence I've
ever had that there really is a God." Id.
If applied, First Amendment scrutiny would likely
invalidate word-bans as unnecessary by even the most lenient First
Amendment forum scrutiny, and such bans are much too broad to
withstand a requirement that restraint of argument content be "no
more restrictive than necessary" to meet a "substantial
governmental interest. ' '  Traditional power of the courts to
exclude arguments on evidentiary foundations gives a court full
ability to meet any efficacy concerns without banning generic
words. In preserving relevant and probative courtroom speech, the
court may halt questioning or argument mid-sentence, if need be, to
steer it toward admissible issues. The words "abortion" or
-sacrifice" alone provide insufficient basis to judge relevance and
could just as conceivably be used in relevant, non-prejudicial
argument (such as "Your honor, the free speech rights of these
abortion protesters should not be sacrificed"). Thus, if the First
Amendment applies, the word-ban is clumsily overbroad because it
treads on protected speech.
Finally, the word-ban creeps dangerously close to viewpoint
discrimination, which is impermissible in even the "nonpublic"
forum. Certainly each side in the courtroom offers competing
viewpoints, yet the Zal word-ban is used to limit the argument
content of only one party. 3 Zal's word-ban was not an edict for the
entire court or against all parties, but only against Zal himself.
5
4
Presumably, the prosecution was free to say "abortion" or
"sacrifice." Power to limit the language (and thus the ideas) of one-
party could easily be used to make it difficult for the unpopular side
and favor the other. Even without yet deciding what type of forum
a courtroom is, such view-point based discrimination is almost per
151. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (setting the
standard for content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation at promoting
a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively
absent the regulation); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288
(1984) (applying the standard); Cooper, supra note 98, at 698-99 (explaining
the time place and manner standard).
152. See Cooper, supra note 98, at 698-99.
153. See Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying an in limine
word ban against only attorney Zal).
154. See id.
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se invalid, even in the most limited governmental forums.'15 The
reason is simple: healthy and robust political debate dictates that
the government must not be able to protect positions it prefers and
trample the positions it dislikes.'56 The courtroom should not be an
exception.
2. No-Citation Rules: Gags Without Cause
Every brief-writing lawyer and law student knows the teeth-
gnashing frustration of finding an on-point court opinion that would
add significant support to her argument if it were not labeled
"unpublished" or "not precedential."' 57 Many circuit courts and
state appellate courts adopt a "no-citation rule" that strips such
prior opinions of precedential value and forbids argument upon
such opinions."' This practice chronically limits courtroom speech
155. See Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (discussing types of
forums and the standards applied): Perry Ed. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educ.
Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (holding that although the state could reserve public
property for an intended use, it could not viewpoint discriminate within that
use).
156. See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S, 377 (1992) (holding
a city ordinance that prohibited cross-burning and other speech that arouses
anger "on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender"
unconstitutional).
157. See INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURE OF THE UNrrED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, CHAPtER 5.3 (setting wide
latitude for an appellate opinion to be labeled "not precedential").
.158. See, e.g., 2D CIR. R. 0.23; 5TH CiR. R. 47.5: 7TH CIR. R. 53(B)(2); 8TH
CIR. R. 28(A)(H); 9TH CIR. R. 36-3: FED. CIR. R. 47.6(B); 10TH CIR. R. 36.3; 1TH
CIR. R. 36-2; 1 tTH CIR. R. 36-3, I.O.P. 5; ALA. R. APP. P. 53(D): ARIZ. SLIP. CT.
R. 111(c): ARIZ. R. Ctv. APP. P. 28(c); ARK. SUP. CT. 5-2(D); CAL. R. CT. 977:
COLO. CT. APP., PolicY of the Court Concerning Citation of Unpublished
Opinions (Apr. 2, 1994); D.C. CL. APP. R. 28(H); TN. Sup. Ci. R. 4. The
foregoing list is not by any means exhaustive. For a complete assessment of all
state and federal rules forbidding and allowing citation to unpublished
opinions, see generally Stephen R. Barnett, No Citation Rules Under Seige: A
Battle field Report and Analysis, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC;ESS 473 (2003)
(definitively outlining current no-citation rules and judicial rule-making
trends). Many other court rules, including state trial courts, allow citation to
such opinions only under restricted circumstances. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 1:36-3
(allowing citation to unpublished opinions only if the citing attorney serves a
copy of the opinion and "all other relevant unpublished opinions" on opposing
- nearly eighty percent of Court of Appeals opinions in a given year
are labeled not precedential. Such prohibition ignores the
politically vital function, especially in a common law system, of
bringing prior rulings to the court's attention in order to reign in
equality and predictability of court rulings. I' °
First, stare decisis is a politically charged doctrine that is
only viable through courtroom speech. As it operates in our
system, the people, as litigants, function to brake judicial law-
making by holding the court to the reasoning of precedent.'
Precedent serves as an essential political device in a common law
system by ensuring that courts uniformly apply the law and consider
all prior reasoning relevant to the petition at hand, not because it
was prior but because it is a vital starting point for equal treatment
and diligent consideration."2 Of course, a court may part from
parties).
159. See Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chaclikes, Constittionaliv of "No-
Citation" Rules, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROcESS 287, 287-88 (2001) (reporting that
nearly eighty percent of all circuit opinions were placed into the "phantom
zone" of non-citability); JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS:
1999 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 49, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus1999/supps.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2005) (on
file with the First Amendment Law Review) (reporting the percentages from
the Administrative Office of the United States).
160. See, e.g., Encore Video, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, No. CIV.A.SA-
97-CA1139FB, 2000 WL 33348240, at *9-10, (W.D. Tx. Oct. 2. 2000)
(emphatically illustrating that non-precedential appellate rulings hinder
uniformity and consistency because the Texas District Court, faced with
contrary earlier precedent on a difficult constitutional issue, could not rely on
a singularly relevant Fifth Circuit opinion, NA TCO v. City of San Antonio,
because that opinion was "non-precedential"). Ironically, the Encore Video
case involved a ruling on the First Amendment. Id. For further discussion of
the role of precedent in a common law system, see supra notes 29-31 and
accompanying text (reviewing the vital importance of precedent in a common
law system).
161. See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000); see
also Griffy's Landscape Maint. LLC v. United States, 51 Fed. C1. 667, 673
(Fed. Cl. 2001) (stating that precedent provides a "brake" on court power).
162. See Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the Founding,
42 B.C. L. REV. 81, 81-83, 94-98 (2000) (departing from the Article III
reasoning of Anasta.soffand finding that precedent and stare decisis were even
more "core ideas" to ensure equal justice and protection of property). Price
argued that, essentially, "a long-standing tradition has viewed precedent as a
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precedent in proper circumstances, but if the people cannot
confront the court with its own prior reasoning, a swell of secret law
may swallow the perception of equal treatment under the law and
with it judicial legitimacy.' Therefore, speech that ensures equality
of legal treatment (or, indeed, even its perception) through freely
confronting a court with its own decisions carries enough political
significance to be recognized by the First Amendment."" At the
very least, such speech should be protected from arbitrary
interference from the very government institution it is aimed to
control.
Second, given the ingrained status of the doctrine of stare
decisis and the weight given to higher court precedent in a common
law system, no-citation rules gag every litigant from structuring an
argument as persuasively as possible. ' 5 The Supreme Court has
necessary starting point for judicial decision. When a court departs from this
idea, it violates the essential function of the judiciary to treat like cases alike
or explain the difference." Id. at 81.
163. See Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret
Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54
VAND. L. REV. 71, 85-121 (2001) (measuring the "secret law" of unpublished
opinions and warning of the inconsistency of factors determining publication
and the disagreement within unpublished opinions).
164. For further discussion, see supra Section II.A.
165. See Honorable Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A
Comment. 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219 (1999) (essay of 8th Circuit judge
who authored Anaslasof/). According to Judge Arnold, unpublished opinions
impermissibly "gag" the bar:
The most important provision of the [8th Cir. No-
citation Rule] occurs in the first sentence, which I
repeat for emphasis: 'Unpublished opinions are not
precedent and parties generally should not cite them.'
As one who came to the bar almost forty years ago, I
find this a startling statement .... The court is saying
that it is not bound by its unpublished opinions. In
general, of course the court on which I sit, like all
courts in common-law countries, recognizes the
doctrine of precedent. A court should not, without
very good reasons publicly acknowledged, depart from
past holdings. Our Rule 28 A(i) says, quite plainly, that
this principle applies only when the court wants it to
apply.... L&en more striking, if we decided a case
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implied this very right in its praise of zealous argument but not yet
connected it to an expression interest:
[I]t is the right of counsel for every litigant to
press his claim, even if it appears farfetched
and untenable, to obtain the court's considered
ruling. Full enjoyment of that right, with due
allowance for the heat of controversy, will be
protected ....
Ironically, the idea of an unrestricted enjoyment of the
"right" to fully argue one's side has been used to support stricter
limitations on attorney out-of-court speech. In In Re Sawyer,1'
7
Justice Frankfurter warned that issues must not be tried in the
media or in the frenzy of public opinion.'" To ensure that this does
not occur, the attorney must have "a forum to make his charges of
unfairness or failure to adhere to principals of law.'' 16 The attorney
will not seek public nullification because:
[H]e has ample chance to make such claims to
the courts in which he litigates. As long as any
tribunal bred in the fundamentals of our legal
tradition ... still exercises judicial power those
claims will be heard and heeded. 
10
When a litigant is prevented from bringing prior judicial
reasoning to a court's attention, he is prevented from arguing
direct/v on point yesterday, lawvers may not even
remind us of this fact. The bar is gagged.
Id. at 221 (emphasis added). Seemingly, Judge Arnold recognizes that the
litigant has an inherent expression interest in bringing prior opinions to the
court's attention, whether he terms it that or not. Id.
For further discussion on the role of precedent. stare decisis, and
historical common law procedures, see Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks,
Unpublished Opinions & The Nature of Precedent, 4 GREEN BA(v 2d 17 (2000);
Fallon, supra note 32; Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished
Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
199 (2001): Price, supra note 162, at 94.
166. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952).
167. 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
168. See id. at 665-69 (Frankfurter, J.. dissenting).
169. See id. at 668.
170. Id.
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adherence to core principals of common law, an expression interest
that every litigant must freely enjoy when petitioning the court.'
Perhaps this is why so many lawyers recoil so violently from
the "no-citation" rules - they are an inherent limitation on offering
the best argument and a bane on the argumentative instinct. It also
explains why Article III and Due Process challenges have found no
purchase to invalidate such rules; the limitations are expressive in
nature.
Like word-bans, if a First Amendment interest attaches to
the content of courtroom argument, it will protect against judicial
abuse by simply requiring a justification that all judges must keep in
mind.' The proffered reasons for no-citation rules, for example,
are primarily administrative and do not indicate the type of
government interest that can outweigh vital political expression
interests. For justification of no-citation rules, the judicial branch
cites primarily costs, volume and general overload, and secondarily
unavailability of unpublished opinions. t7' While costs and overload
are important, the advent of electronic databases has eliminated the
spacing and cost problems with which earlier paper-publishing
courts were concerned.175  Unavailability is also much less of a
171. See Arnold, supra note 165, at 221-23 (arguing that all judicial
decisions have precedential value in application of the law).
172. See Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985) (stating that the
extent to which a government may regulate speech depends on the type of
forum).
173. See Arnold, supra note 165, at 221 (summarizing the defense of no-
citation rules in one word: "volume").
174. See id.; Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., The No-Citation Rule For
Unpublished Opinions: Do the Ends of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate
Courts Justify the Means of Secrecy?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 235. 241-44 (1998)
(discussing reasons given for no-citation rules); Honorable Boyce F. Martin,
Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIo ST. L. 177. 181-83 (1999)
(summarizing the case for unpublished opinions as one of keeping
administration of justice practicable by recognizing that there are "too many
cases, too little merit"). According to Judge Martin, the concerns of a base of
"secret law" arc overstated and if every opinion had precedential value, circuit
court caselaw would become a confusing "Tower of Babel." Martin, supra, at
178.
175. See Hannon, supra note 165, at 206-40 (extensively detailing the
effect of electronic databases on the need for unpublished opinions).
290 FIRS T AMENDMENT LA W REVIE W [Vol. 3
concern. 6 Formidable First Amendment interests, as discussed
above, should not be automatically subordinate to such concerns
without scrutiny. The "no-citation" rules must be tested.
IV. A WORKABLE FI RST AMENDMENT STANDARD FOR
COURTROOM ARGUMENT WITHOUT SACRIFICING PRACTICAL
RESTRAINTS
While this Article has gone to great lengths to show the
existence of a substantial First Amendment interest in courtroom
argument and serious concern with its unchecked obstruction, it
would be altogether remiss not to offer a solution. Because the
people must be free to petition the court with their best, most
influential ideas, the solution lies in accepting the courtroom as a
forum dedicated to a certain type of speech.17 The solution must be
flexible enough to compensate the two competing interests,
protection of speech aimed to influence, change or mold the




At the outset, an initial practical confusion must be solved -
mostly by seeing the forest, not the talking trees. To best protect
the political speech concerns of courtroom argument, the First
Amendment standard applied must not separate the attorney from
the client. Too many courts and commentators get tied in logical
knots and fail to find solid First Amendment footing for in-court
176. Both Westlaw and LexisNexis carry nearly all court opinions,
published and unpublished, precedential and non-precedential. Legal
periodicals also publish synopses and make available unpublished opinions.
See, e.g., Case Digests. 173 N.J. L.J. 525.545 (2003) (publishing certain federal
and state cases in full); Unpublished Opinions, 173 N.J. L. 525, 558 (2003)
(making full text of unpublished opinions available). Incidentally, the fact that
Law Journals actually publish synopses of unpublished opinions goes far to
illustrate that such opinions still have impact on the rule of law.
177. See Velazquez v. Legal Serv. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 771-72 (2d Cir.
1999) (stating that the courtroom is the best "marketplace" for argument that
the rules or laws of the government are unconstitutional or illegal).
178. For a discussion of the vital political nature of courtroom argument
and its contribution to self-government, see supra notes 23-81 and
accompanying text.
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argument by considering the attorney alone.M) This method focuses
unnecessarily on the attorney's right to speak as an individual (such
as wearing a button or giving a speech) but forgets the client's need
to argue freely, or have someone argue freely, on his behalf. 
180
Because the attorney is in the courtroom to speak for his client,
examining the rights of the attorney alone leads inevitably to the
extreme view that the attorney has no, or very little, right of
expression inside the courtroom and therefore the First
Amendment does not exist at all in court." This view is difficult to
argue with when one imagines a clientless attorney attempting to
argue a nonexistent case.s?
But the view that an attorney may only speak "to the extent
that his client's rights allow him to speak" ' should not remove the
First Amendment from the courtroom so handily.' 4 The separation
of the attorney need only stand for the revelation that an attorney
cannot seek a court ruling on his own issues or rant Pacino-like at
179. See, e.g., Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1992) (Trott,
J., concurring) (arguing that an attorney retains no independent First
Amendment rights inside a courtroom): Wendel, supra note 46, at 379-81
(arguing for the limited rights approach).
180. See Wendel, supra note 46, at 379-81; see also Cooper, supra note 98
(analogizing courtroom speech to government funded speech). This is the
flawed analysis that the Zal majority applied, worried about the political
statements that the attorney himself might make without seeing the interest
the attorney's client had in freely preparing an uninhibited argument. See Zal,
968 F.2d at 927-28.
181. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev.. 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991)
(distinguishing in-court speech as "extremely circumscribed"): Zal. 968 F.2d at
931-32 (Trott, J.. concurring) ("In a courtroom, a lawyer without a client is like
an actor without a part: he has no role to play, and no lines to deliver."). For a
further discussion of this view, see supra Section III A.
182. For example, one scholar has disregarded the client's speech interest
to such an extent as to propose that by licensing an attorney, the state grants
entitlement to courtroom speech and therefore may attach restrictions
because the lawyer herself is not giving up constitutional rights she otherwise
had. See Wendel, supra note 46, at 379-81 (analogizing courtroom speech to
government funded speech). This is a stretch that the judiciary has yet to
address, but is another lurking limitation to courtroom free speech interests if
only the attorney's interest is considered. See id.
183. Zal, 968 F.2d at 931 (Trott, J., concurring).
184. See id. at 931-32.
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the court on his own topics - merely a reiteration of evidentiary and
standing limitations. While separating the attorney and client is
most appropriate strategy for analysis of speech outside the
courtroom, it is unnecessary for speech inside the courtroom.15 The
attorney/client relationship, both contractually and practically,
inside the courtroom is so close that the same standard may be
applied to both, jointly. A client rarely speaks in court, and the
attorney has almost total control over the content of briefs and
arguments."" The attorney is duty bound to speak on behalf of the
client and represent the client's rights. Therefore, in controlling
the content of speech before the court, the attorney should take on
the speech interest that the client has, as if they were jointly
"litigants" with the same issues before the court. The parallel is
exact - where the client might wear a "Save the Whales" button, so
could the attorney, and where the client might make an argument
to the court, so could the attorney. ' The attorney, then, does not
have "extremely circumscribed" First Amendment rights inside the
courtroom, as many have suggested, but rather that he possesses
exactly the same First Amendment rights as his client, and is limited
by the same court rules.
Next, proper First Amendment forum analysis will move
away from the Gentile "extremely circumscribed" dicta to ensure
that courtroom speech is given its due consideration as politically
charged expression in a forum provided specifically for that
expression."M Courtroom speech is, after all, speech upon
185. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92. at 859 (outlining lawyer's free
speech rights outside the courthouse): Cooper. supra note 98, at 677
(reviewing disciplinary action against lawyer speech outside the courtroom).
186. See SCHULTZ & SIRICO, supra note 3, at 301-343 (describing tactics
and strategies for brief preparations, oral argument, and oral communication
on behalf of the client).
187. See, e.g., PA. R.P.C. 1.1-1.16 (outlining the typical ethical duties of
the attorney/client relationship in order to protect the client's rights).
188. See In re Frankel, 165 A.D.2d 382, 386-87 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
(holding that an attorney may wear a political slogan on his or her person
during a trial).
189. See Zal, 968 F.2d at 927-28 (ignoring proper forum analysis);
Velazquez v. Legal Serv. Corp., 164 F.3d 757. 771-72 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding
that the courtroom is the best marketplace for "ideas" presented by the
litigants and extolling the importance of free flowing "ideas" in the
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government property established for that purpose, leaving the
judiciary's assumption of total mastery over courtroom proceedings
out of kilter with its own forum jurisprudence. The appropriate
standard need not totally reject the Gentile sentiment, but rather
recognize that -circumscribed" refers only to the power of the court
to halt argument for valid justiciability, standing, jurisdiction,
evidentiary, or timing reasons. These functionality concerns can be
addressed within a candid analysis of the courtroom as a
government forum for expression of the most important type.
First, a modified version of modern "public forum" analysis
will provide the appropriate scrutiny because the courtroom shares
much in common, in practice and policy, with both the widest
public forum and the narrowest limited forum. Generally, in all
places that "by long tradition or by government fiat have been
devoted to assembly and debate," ' speech is given the greatest
protection, and any restriction on content in these "quintessential
public forums" must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
interest). 2 While not quite a public park, the courtroom swells with
a long tradition of "assembly and debate," stems from the historical
"right to petition," and encompasses politically important issues. '
In fact, courtrooms have since time immemorial been devoted by
the government solely to the speech of the petitioning public) 4 As
discussed above, this speech resounds in political importance, both
as a petition to the government from its supposed masters - the
people - and as a direct contribution to the political and social
marketplace of ideas." Even the surface distinction that only
courtroom).
190. See Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 799-800 (1985) (describing
the first step in determining whether speech restrictions on government
property are valid).
191. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).
192. Id. at 45-46 (summarizing the public forum analysis and the various
types of government expression forums).
193. For further discussion of the historical and traditionally political
background of courtroom speech. including its subsuming of the right to
petition, see supra notes 23-81 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 23-81 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 23-81 and accompanying text.
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certain parties are allowed to speak in the courtroom is not wholly
accurate, for often any person may choose to weigh in on an issue
before the court by filing an amicus curiae brief, a procedural nod
by the judiciary that the issues before it are open for public debate
and that the court is concerned with broader policies and social
impact of its decision than may be raised by the instant parties. '
Conversely, the limited purpose for which the courtroom
exists removes it somewhat from the company of venues in which
the public can at will debate any issue it likes. It is not likely, for
instance, that a court would hear argument on "what a bastard the
presidential candidate is" or other quite valid point for the park
soap-box. The fact that the judicial branch is set up specifically for
hearing and adjudicating grievances, both civil and criminal, public
and private, links it closely with "designated public forums," and
"limited public forums." 7 In Perry Education Association v. Perry
Local Educators' Association', the Supreme Court first recognized
that non-public government property might be opened for a limited
expressive purpose.", Although the government holds wide
latitude in keeping the forum limited to speech related to that
purpose, as long as the speaker stays within the designated purpose,
the speech is protected from arbitrary limitation and viewpoint
discrimination.2" A courtroom shares much in common with this
description, as it has many functional rules and is limited to the
purpose of hearing parties that have a legal grievance."" If applied,
196. See, e.g., PA. R. App. P. 531(a) (allowing "[a]nyone interested in the
questions involved in any matter" to file a brief amicus curiae addressing those
questions without applying for leave of the appellate court).
197. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-47 (describing designated and limited
public forums).
198. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
199. See id. at 47-49 (holding that a public school mailbox system was not
enough of a traditional public forum to require access to outside labor unions
because the mailbox system was "limited" to student related news and
activities - a purpose that the labor unions did not address).
200. See id. (describing the limited purpose forum).
201. An interesting parallel might be drawn between the courtroom and
the television political debate. In Arkansas Education Television Commission
v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998). the Supreme Court found that the intensely
important journalistic control of PBS over its own debate overrode a right of
access by third-party candidates. Id. at 681. The judiciary has a similar, if
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no speech properly before the court could be arbitrarily limited
without scrutiny, because it is within the purpose for which the
courtroom is provided.
Lenient "limited purpose forum" analysis, however, does
not fully protect the fundamental First Amendment political speech
concerns raised by limitation of courtroom argument content. 2O2
"Limited purpose" analysis is inappropriate for forums that are in
nature, history, and tradition forums for expressive activity, a
criteria that practically governs modern forum analysis.2'3  The
more limited, discretion as to which parties are before it. That discretion
assumed, arguendo, little doubt remains that once the debater is properly
participating, or once the litigant is properly before the court, the
government's discretion ends and a free speech interest applies in the content
of what is presented. For further discussion on Forbes and the control over
political debates, see David Cardone, lhe 'Dread of Tvrants': Defending the
Free-Speech Rights of Independent Political Candidates, PA. LAW., May/June
2004, at 14. 20 (arguing that the current standard prescribes vital political
speech and that "the airwaves, not parks and sidewalks, are today's traditional
public forum").
202. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICEs 205-10 (1985)
(criticizing Perry's categorical analysis as failing to sufficiently address the
fluid interests of the First Amendment), Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak,
The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First
Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1234 (1 984) (reasoning that
forum categories ignore the real First Amendment values and concerns).
Justice Brennan had misgivings about public forum categorization as well. In
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990), a case where the majority
upheld a ban on sidewalk solicitation, Justice Brennan, in dissent, observed
that "public forum categories - originally conceived of as a way of preserving
First Amendment rights... - have been used [to uphold] restrictions on
speech." Id. at 741 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). For a
discussion of the political concerns raised by arbitrary or discriminating
obstruction of courtroom argument, see supra notes 128-176 and
accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 804-09 (1985) (basing
its decision to uphold a ban on private groups from participating in a federal
office fund raising event on the fact that federal offices are not traditionally or
by nature set aside for expressive activity). Generally, limited purpose forums
apply to non-speech related areas that are opened by the government to the
public - an outcropping of the non-public forum, which are those places that
are not associated with or established for expression at all, such as office
buildings. See id. Interestingly, the halls and municipal offices surrounding a
courtroom have often been found to be "nonpublic forums" because their
courtroom is innately a government provided place where the
people air grievances and argue legal, social and equitable issues.!0
Speech, written and oral, flows naturally in such a forum. The
subsuming of the "right to petition" into courtroom function only
strengthens the notion of the courtroom as the traditional place for
speech directed to and about government. 0
Therefore, to properly protect the vital political importance
of courtroom speech and to account for the historical and
traditional purpose of the courtroom as a place of free expression
aimed at law and policy, a modified standard combining the
"4quintessential public forum" with the "limited purpose forum"
must be created. As is often the case with new First Amendment
principles, a simple balancing test will merely muddy the waters and
may rarely work to effectively protect against improper
regulation. Instead, once the First Amendment interest in the
content of argument is recognized, content-based protection fits
naturally. Presuming that fair and orderly adjudication is a
sufficient compelling interest, to meet that interest the judiciary
must heed the traditional and political importance of courtroom
expression and apply only the most narrow and necessary
restrictions upon content of the argument before it. To maintain
order in an already clogged system, core court functions that govern
how and when argument is presented, such as standing and
evidentiary rules, will be presumed to meet this standard. Of
course, the internal operating procedures of the courthouse itself,
administrative function has nothing to do with the traditional airing of views
and debate. See, e.g., Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court. 303 F.3d 959.
965-66 (9th Cir. 2002). Even in such non-public forums, however, arbitrary
speech restrictions are unconstitutional, with the government requiring a
"reasonable" purpose that is not an effort to suppress the speaker's viewpoint.
See id.
204. For further discussion of the speech interest in courtroom argument,
see supra notes 23-81 and accompanying text.
205. See Calif. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,
510 (1972) (accepting the Court's role in fulfilling the right to petition);
Wolfgram, supra note 36, at 292-94 (objecting to the Court's subsuming of the
traditional practice of petitioning the government).
206. See Wendel. supra note 46, at 310-11 (sarcastically refraining from
adding another pebble to the rock heap of balancing tests).
207. See Martin, supra note 174.
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such as oral argument timing or the operating hours of the
courthouse, can easily be deemed valid time, place, and manner
restrictions within the forum.
Such a standard does not unreasonably curtail the power of
the court, which must retain substantial grip over courtroom
proceedings. If a word or phrase will prejudice a fair trial, the court
will be free to preclude its reference. 2°' The litigant, however, will
have a standard of review to rely upon to prevent improper or
overly broad restriction. For instance, banning general words such
as "sacrifice" or "race" will likely not be narrow enough to protect
the litigant's interest in controlling argument content. The standard
isn't impossible to meet, but rather the proper heightened scrutiny
to allow review of such politically charged speech as courtroom
argument.
Lastly, although the above solution is described as a
modified modern public forum analysis, in practice it operates
rather like earlier Supreme Court public forum reasoning outlined
in Grayned. The more flexible Grayned standard is specifically
designed to keep restrictions from treading unnecessarily upon
protected speech by calculating the purpose of the forum and
whether the speech that has been limited would have been wholly
inconsistent with such purposes."" This standard applies
appropriately to the courtroom, which does not neatly fit the
categories of modern forum reasoning. Applied to the courtroom,
as the New York Supreme Court ventured in Frankel, courtroom
speech should not be limited unless it is inconsistent with the
purposes of conducting a trial or threatens the efficient
administration of justice." ' Conceptually, this standard provides
208. Arguably. in Cook v. Philadelphia Transportation Company, 199
A.2d 446 (Pa. 1964), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was within its discretion
when it prohibited mention of a store name, "Crazy Bar," because it perceived
that the name might prejudice a jury against a patron that otherwise had no
evidence of drinking against him. 1d. at 446-49.
209. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (deciding
"whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal
activity of a particular place at a particular time").
210. See id. (finding that a protest was basically incompatible with school
grounds during classes).
211. See In re Frankel, 165 A.D.2d 382, 385 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
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the needed flexibility to account for both the political vitality and
traditionally expressive nature of courtroom speech and the
inherent control a judge must exercise in her courtroom.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article means only to accomplish the modest goal of
returning some control over the judicial process to the litigants
themselves. If a First Amendment interest in freely controlling
one's presentation to the judiciary is adopted, it will simply give the
court system a concrete ideal to consider before it adopts rules and
procedures that cut broad swaths out of the litigant's presentation.
i, like most attorneys, cringe at the increasing crushing
administrative reasons given to overbear full and fair argument.
Although attorneys will doubtless for the life of the judicial system
be subject to the whims of the courts when submitting briefs or
making oral argument, no branch of government should
automatically assume unreviewable control over any speech offered
by the people, much less political speech. 2 This Article illustrates
the vital and traditional political role that courtroom argument
plays in our great experiment, self-government.9  This Article then
warns that, by failing to recognize the courtroom as a traditional
forum for expression, not only does the judiciary fail to properly
acknowledge the political nature of courtroom argument, but it
clears itself of any scrutiny for arbitrary or discriminating limitation
of such argument.' Some of these limitations thwart the very
perception of a judiciary that is bound to the duties of a common
law system and is controlled by equal treatment for all litigants.
Finally, very little reason exists to maintain the status quo because
the First Amendment is flexible enough to apply within the
212. For a discussion of the political impact of courtroom speech, see
supra notes 23-81 and accompanying text.
213. For a discussion of the role of courtroom argument, including using
courtroom argument as a means to exercise the right to petition, see supra
notes 26-39 and accompanying text
214. For a discussion of the judiciary's lack of forum analysis, see suipra
notes 88-127 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 88-127 and accompanying text.
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courtroom without sacrificing the necessary practical controls of the
judicial process.2t
As a whole, however, the First Amendment's first principle
of ensuring self-government is no less important within the
courtroom than without. After all, the judicial system is nothing if
it is not, both in perception and in reality, a fair and equitable place
for the people to petition for social redress. The Judicial Branch,
given its generally non-elected position, singular power over the
rights of the people, common-law determining role, and checking
capacity over the executive and legislature, must recognize that it is
not anointed Solomon. Rather, the judiciary serves the people with
specific duties that limit its power. The most effective of such
limitations, and therefore the most important to the First
Amendment's ideal of self-government, is that the people be free to
control their appeal to the court and lay before it their most
influential position.
216. For an analysis of forum standards and their applicability to the
courtroom, see supra notes 189-210 and accompanying text.
217. For a discussion of the right to petition, see supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
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